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RELEASE OF GRAND JURY MINUTES IN THE NA-TIONAL DEPOSITION PROGRAM OF THE ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT CASES
I. THE SCOPE OF THE LITIGATION
Beginning in September 1959, five federal grand juries in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania investigated the activities of the electrical equipment manufacturers. ' This investigation resulted in twenty criminal indictments under the Sherman Act 2 against a total of twenty-nine manufacturers and forty-four individuals. 3 Each indictment was based upon a specific type of equipment, called a "product line," made by three or more of the companies involved. Following the indictments and subsequent convictions, approximately 1,900 private antitrust treble damage actions 4 were filed in thirty-four judicial districts. 5 This litigation created serious problems of judicial administration. First, this is "multiple litigation," which consists of cases in more than one judicial district involving common questions of fact requiring the testimony of the same witnesses. Moreover, these cases will strain the resources of both the courts and the parties. For example, more than 400 such actions were filed -in the Southern District of New York alone during the 1962 entered by each local district in which -these cases were pending, the Murrah Committee concurrently asked all judges in such districts to enter NPTO 1 19 which stayed all depositions and other discovery until a voluntary national deposition program could be formulated. 20 As finally formulated, NPTO 8 stays plaintiffs from taking further depositions of present or former employees of defendants except as provided in the order or subsequent orders of the court. 21 Schedule A to the order provides that the depositions will be taken before a judge, 22 that the deposition may be used in accordance with rule 26(d) 23 by or against any party present or represented at the deposition or who had notice thereof, 2 4 and that the scope of examination shall be governed by rule 26, except 19 See Murrah Committee, BuLLETIN No. 4, at 2 (Aug. 20, 1962) . This procedure can be justified on the ground that since these depositions were to be presided over by a judge, see San Francisco tr. 12-13, 15-16, the Judicial Conference, acting through the Murrah Committee, was preparing "plans for assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary . . . ." See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1958) . 20 See 1963 REPORT 5; cf. Handbook 383, 388. In addition to NPTO 1 the committee recommended entry of NPTO 2, NPTO 6 (providing for uniform interrogatories by defendants with regard to transactions with plaintiffs), and NPTO 5 (providing for similar interrogatories by plaintiffs with regard to meetings and pricing policies of defendants). See 1963 REPORT 5-6. In addition NPTO 3 provides for the stipulation of certain facts; NPTO 4 provides a schedule for defendants' "rule 12" motions; and NPTO 7 provides the terms for placing certain cases on a "standby basis." See id. at 6-7. These seven orders were based on similar orders already entered in the Southern District of New York.
This control over discovery by the district court is supportable on the following grounds: (1) the general equity powers of the court; (2) FED. R. Civ. P. 1, which provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," see Freund, The Pleading and Pretrial of an Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555, 561 (1961) ; and (3) FED. R. Civ. P. 16, which provides that the court may order a pretrial conference to consider "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." Cf. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PRO-CEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 24-26 (1955) , proposing that rule 16 be amended to provide that the chief judge of a district be empowered to assign a protracted case to a designated judge for "control of all matters preliminary to trial, including control of the taking of depositions and of discovery . . . ." The Committee's comment on this section indicates that it would implement the Prettyman Report, see note 11 supra, but that the courts already possess the powers detailed in the amendment. Compare Memorandum 3-4, accepting the reasoning that the courts possess these powers under rule 16, even though the 1955 amendment was not adopted by the Supreme Court.
21 NPTO 8, 1 2-3. 
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
24 NPTO 8, Schedule A, 112. Among the implications of this provision is that the deposition binds virtually all parties in all districts since the order provides that the depositions will be noticed in each district where the order has been entered. See id. f 3. Compare Memorandum 3. While the primary purpose of this paragraph is to make it abundantly clear that rule 26(d) applies, it has been relied on to term the deposition a "trial deposition. The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: 1, that the witness is dead; or 2, that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing . . . or 4, that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 5, upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice . . . to allow the deposition to be used.
that examination relating to specific damages of any individual plaintiff "shall not be had until further order of [the] . . . Court." 2 5 Schedule B, entered in each district approximately two weeks after the principal order, provides that parties represented by counsel at the deposition shall conclude their interrogation prior to a forty-day adjournment of the deposition.
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" By allowing absent counsel to read the transcripts and then move for further examination within thirty days, the adjournment process eases the impact of the initial order on small plaintiffs and defendants who might not be financially able to have counsel at all of the depositions. 27 In the absence of such application, further interrogation by deposition is barred, except on order of the deposition judge for good cause shown by any party. 8 NPTO 8 was not entered at the Chicago hearing; instead, an order was entered to show cause why the form agreed upon should not be accepted. 29 This process allows any party to object to the entry of the order at a subsequent pretrial hearing, and allows time for similar showcause orders to be entered in other districts." However, once the order has been recommended on the national level, it has been impossible to alter it since local objections have been overruled in virtually all cases.
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The pressure for conformity has prevented a variance in a national order to allow the resolution of a local motion for the production of documents which was pending when the national order was recommended. 3 2 In like manner smaller parties, who were not heard in Chicago during the drafting process and whose interests differed from the large, represented defendants,3 have been relatively unsuccessful in obtaining special provisions applicable to them. 34 Despite this, the national deposition program has proved successful in avoiding thirty-four repetitious depositions of the same depo--NPTO 8, Schedule A, 114. Local discovery was to be provided later with regard to individual damages. nents and in permitting a single ruling on the scope and relevance of the testimony sought during any given deposition. 35 Moreover, the smaller parties on both sides can rely on the larger parties' counsel to ask all of the initial questions, resulting in substantial financial savings.
B. National Pretrial Order 9-A Nationalized Procedure
While NPTO 8 was formulated through negotiations between opposing counsel, NPTO 9, which requires -the production of numerous documents in connection with the plaintiffs' first round, 8 was adopted under a more representative procedure. Counsel for both sides submitted drafts of the proposed NPTO 9 and met together to seek areas of agreement.3 However, the remaining areas of disagreement were not resolved through local show-cause orders in the same manner as NPTO 8, but were settled after argument by counsel from both sides before a national hearing held by the Murrah Committee and certain other judges.
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After the judges heard the principal arguments, a recess for deliberation was taken, 8 9 following which the committee announced its resolution of the issues; 40 a draft of the modified order was prepared and objections were heard and decided the same day. 41 This nationalized "town-meeting" procedure became the model for formulating many subsequent national pretrial orders, among them NPTO 10, which scheduled the first round of twelve depositions. 42 This procedure has the unique benefit of drawing all the parties and the judges together to resolve the problems of a national order. Only one judge in one division of a district in which these cases are pending has refused to enter the orders implementing the national discovery program. 43 3 5 However, this procedure does not avoid the problems of diverse rulings concerning the admissibility of matter contained in the deposition when it is offered at trial. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
36 The documents required to be produced by NPTO 9 included: all documents produced by the defendants before the grand juries; the expense accounts, travel vouchers, and appointment books for seventy-six employees of the defendants; papers used at or prepared by employees in connection with competitors' meetings, and similar materials. See NPTO 9, [4(a), (c)-(f 41 See id. at 101. 42 The procedure used to formulate some of the later orders, particularly those dealing with defendants' interrogatories and depositions, was similar to that used for NPTO 8, in that arguments were held only in the lead districts of the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of New York. However, many more parties were represented at these later arguments than at the arguments on NPTO 8, and the procedure appears to have been far more "national" in scope.
4 3 Judge Halbert (N.D. Cal. N. Div.) refused to enter the orders as contradicting his prior order directing production of certain documents. Instead, he stayed However, it intensifies the burden on all of the parties to be present and to register their objections, for local objections have been of little effect once the national order is drafted.
C. The Subsequent Rounds
While the first depositions were being taken, counsel met with the judges to consider the next phase of the national deposition program. 44 After the completion of the first round, counsel again met with the Murrah Committee at a nationwide meeting which resulted in NPTO 11, establishing the second round of depositions. 45 The pattern of a nationalized meeting was repeated again in May 1963 when seventy-two attorneys met with thirty-six judges during the latter stages of the second round to establish the final steps in the plaintiffs' program of national depositions 6 This meeting initiated the procedure of having each judge present sit as if he were presiding as a district judge at a pretrial hearing in his own district 4 7-resulting in one simultaneous pretrial hearing for more than 1,800 cases. In addition the ensuing orders, among them NPTO 16 scheduling a third round of depositions, 48 adopted a priority theory of discovery for the product lines that would be tried first. 49 Finally, the program has now grown beyond the scope of plaintiffs' national discovery. NPTO 25 provided for the first round of defendants' national depositions in the priority product lines.
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However, too many depositions were scheduled under NPTO 25,51 and NPTO 30 was formulated, revising the schedule for defendants' round one and adding defendants' round two. 52 In retrospect a program which began as an experiment attempting to coordinate discovery proceedings has become an established procedure leading to more than thirty uniformly adopted national pretrial orders, scheduling 178 depositions and requiring production of thousands of documents incident to these depositions.
III. GRAND JURY RELEASE AND THE NATIONAL DEPOSITION PROGRAM
A. The Doctrine of Secrecy and Standards for the Release of Grand Jury Minutes
The proceedings of a grand jury have traditionally been secret, 53 and that secrecy has usually been protected by denying motions for the release of grand jury testimony. 54 However, this policy has been seriously challenged by plaintiffs' demands for inspection and release of grand jury minutes in the electrical cases, and the problem of when grand jury secrecy should be breached has become a central issue in these cases. 55 Five reasons have been advanced for maintaining grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons . . . from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation .... 56
The primary rationales for secrecy are institutional; all of the reasons but the last are designed to protect the grand jury itself 57 and the criminal process, but not those brought before the grand jury. becomes inapplicable once the defendant is indicted, 59 the second when the grand jury has been discharged, and the third when the trial is completed. However, the fourth reason, encouraging free disclosure, is applicable no matter when disclosure is sought, although it may become less important as time passes. The last reason, protecting the innocent, does not lose its force with the passage of time. Every release of testimony may withdraw protection from innocent suspects and witnesses, and, even when it does not affect the grand jury involved, may retard free disclosure by witnesses before subsequent grand juries. Thus, courts have treated secrecy as a general policy, preserved even if there is no immediate need therefor, unless the movant is able to show a compelling reason for release. 60 The problem of when grand jury secrecy should be breached is particularly acute in antitrust cases; the need to encourage the candor of witnesses is unusually great because the witnesses are often employees, officers, customers, or suppliers of a potential defendant."' The Supreme Court has stated that if the witness knew that his supposedly secret narrative would be revealed to the accused, "testimony would be parsimonious," particularly "in antitrust proceedings where fear of business reprisal might haunt both the grand juror and the witness." 62 Even though the same line of testimony may be revealed at trial, release of grand jury minutes might be more likely to provoke reprisal because the witness may have been less guarded in his testimony concerning personal business relationships. Thus, the standards for breach of secrecy should be particularly high in an antitrust case to promote full disclosure before the grand jury.
Despite the strong reasons for the protection of secrecy, the courts have constructed standards for the release of grand jury testimony in certain categories of cases. These tests now implement criminal rule 6(e), which provides:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a 5 9 See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1155 (1963) . In allowing release "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding," rule 6(e) controls both civil and criminal cases.6 4 In essence the civil party is making a motion addressed to the court's jurisdiction over the grand jury as an arm of the court which, as a part of the criminal process, is governed by the rules of criminal procedure.
The first category of cases in which release has been granted consists of situations where the criminal defendant seeks the grand jury minutes to challenge the indictment, to obtain evidence favorable to him, or to impeach a Government witness. " where the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim to inspect the minutes of the Government's key witness as a matter of right, but held that disclosure would be "proper where the ends of justice require it," or where defendants had shown "'a particularized need' . . . which outweighs the policy of secrecy." 7-The Court also stated that a showing of contradiction between trial and grand jury testimony would not be necessary. 
87, 89 (1964).
O8 310 U.S. 150 (1940 The second class of cases involves motions by governmental or quasigovernmental bodies to obtain the minutes for use in subsequent proceedings. In the first case of this type, a petition to vacate an order releasing the minutes of a grand jury of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for use by the federal government in a beer-permit revocation proceeding in New Jersey was denied on the ground that release would further the ends of justice.7
In another case minutes were released to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to aid an investigation of possible misconduct by a police officer. 74 Similarly, in Doe v. Rosenberry, 75 the petitioner moved for the return of grand jury minutes previously released to a state bar grievance committee pursuant to the suggestion of a federal grand jury which had failed to indict the movant on charges of corruption and criminal activity. In sustaining the denial of the motion, the Second Circuit held that the hearing before the grievance committee was a judicial proceeding within rule 6(e), and that the rule was not limited to criminal proceedings:
[T] he term "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person . . . with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest, even though such compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment of crime. An interpretation that should not go at least so far, would not only be in the teeth of the language employed, but would defeat any rational purpose that can be imputed to the Rule. 76 Release has also been granted to local government authorities, pursuant to the suggestion of the grand jury, to determine whether state criminal prosecutions should be sought. 77 In these situations the grand jury's recommendation of release does not affect the general policy of secrecy, but since the particular grand jury has waived secrecy as a protection for itself, release has been easier to obtain. In addition recommendation of release to another authority may reduce the return of tenuous federal indictments.
The third class of cases involves a relatively rare situation in which the civil defendant seeks to obtain the grand jury minutes of the private civil plaintiff who has been either a Government witness or a defendant in a preceeding criminal antitrust action. In either situation the defendant's motion is based upon the theory that a civil plaintiff should not be allowed to conceal facts which are unfavorable to his case in his prior testimony. In a most unusual case defendants in a private treble damage action were allowed discovery of plaintiff's grand jury minutes 78 when plaintiff's deposition answers were vague if not unresponsive, despite the opposition of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. 79 Similarly, release was apparently allowed in a case where plaintiff put his grand jury testimony in issue during his deposition when he stated that testimony favoring the defendant which he had given before the grand jury was untrue.
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The last situation in which release has been granted arises when the defendant in a civil action brought by the Government after a grand jury investigation seeks to obtain favorable evidence in the minutes.
8 ' Although the defendant may be claiming that the grand jury process was subverted because the Government never intended to seek a criminal indictment, 82 the principal argument is that the Government should not be allowed to suppress unfavorable evidence in the minutes while using favorable portions to refresh a witness' memory. This theory has also been employed by the criminal defendant, but it may not be as persuasive in civil cases because of the alternative methods of 'discovery.
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However, one court responded to -this problem by finding that the imbalance arising from the Government's use of the minutes was sufficient cause for production of the minutes of all witnesses who would be called at trial. pursuant to an order granting defendant's motions under rule 6(e) and rule 34 s 6 The Court held that grand jury secrecy would not be breached except for "compelling necessity" which had to "be shown with particularity." 87 The most important clue to the elusive test for grand jury release was contained in a dictum that the use of the grand jury minutes to impeach a witness or to refresh his recollection were "cases of particularized need where the secrecy . . . is lifted discreetly and limitedly." 8 However, none of these phrases is particularly helpful in determining when release should be allowed because the basic problem is one of balancing the need for release against the reasons for secrecy.
B. A Rationale for Release to Plaintiffs in Antitrust Cases
The electrical equipment cases represent the first attempts by a civil plaintiff to obtain the grand jury minutes of a civil defendant. Each motion for release of the grand jury minutes in these cases was met with the argument that secrecy must be preserved. However, in civil antitrust cases there are also countervailing policy factors to be considered. The courts have often emphasized that Congress intended to use the private treble damage action as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws.
8 9 The Second Circuit has recently said that the private treble damage action supplies "much of the teeth behind the federal government's attempt to eliminate anti-competitive practices and to free our economic system from the devitalizing influences of monopoly." 10 Supporting this articulated policy favoring private enforcement of the antitrust laws is the holding in Doe v. Rosenberry 91 that rule 6(e) applies to any judicial proceeding which seeks to require the compliance of a person with standards imposed on private conduct in the public interest. Under this analysis a private treble damage action represents a situation where the public interest in allowing release to further the enforcement of the antitrust laws must be balanced against the policy of secrecy. 92 Moreover, release may be necessary to prevent the defendant from concealing matters revealed before the grand jury.
86FED. R. CRIm. P. 6(e) ; FEz. R. Cirv , where the court rejected the FTC argument that Doe v. Rosenberry, mtpra note 91, established a settled rule authorizing disclosure to further the law-enforcement functions of other governmental agencies. The court held that no such rule was established; that if it were, it would be disregarded; and that Doe v. Rosenberry rested on a determination that the ends of justice outweighed secrecy. When the plenary investigative powers of the FTC are considered, the result of this case does not militate against release to a private movant without those powers if the balancing of competing interests is resolved in his favor.
The problem is what additional advantages should be granted to aid the civil plaintiff in recovering under the antitrust laws. Under the enforcement rationale of Doe v. Rosenberry, there seems to be no legitimate reason for denying release to any plaintiff, whether or not a governmental or quasi-governmental agency, if the effect of this added advantage is the more efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws without a concurrent emasculation of the grand jury as a criminal investigative device. Where the benefit gained by aiding the private party, acting as a "private attorney general," outweighs the harm to the grand jury system, the test of compelling necessity has been met.
C. Formulation of a National Release Process
The Initial Motion for Release
During the first deposition under NPTO 10, 9 4 held in Philadelphia, plaintiffs moved for production of a statement dictated by the deponent to his employer's counsel immediately after his appearance before the grand jury.
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The motion was granted, and the deponent's "memory became sharper and keener than it had been up to that time." 9 6
Plaintiffs then moved before Judge Clary to inspect deponent's grand jury minutes. 97 In denying release after an in camera examination, the court recognized the importance of encouraging free disclosure before antitrust grand juries. The court stated that secrecy would be preserved as a general policy except on a showing of "particular compelling need"; 99 however, the court suggested that the result might have been different if the deponent's grand jury summary had not been available. 00 If the opinion had been confined to plaintiffs' motion to inspect, it would not have been significant. However, Judge Clary, anticipating future problems in the onrushing deposition program, continued: 95 See OT N219 (Oct. 2, 1962). The transcripts of the national depositions were filed in each district in which the electrical cases were pending and these transcripts were serially paginated to provide nationwide uniformity. [The transcripts are cited herein as follows: the symbol OT will be used for the official transcript (unbound) and NDT for the private printing (bound) which is being used for filing in the courts. These statements are hereinafter referred to as grand jury summaries]. [T] he Grand jury transcript of any witness deposed in this program, either in this district or in any other district . . . in which these cases are pending, should be made available to the deposition judge for use in his district. There may be and probably will be many instances during these national depositions when disclosure may be advisable.' 0 '
He also stated that the refusal to release in this instance did not preclude release when an in camera examination disclosed material discrepancies or significant facts which the deponent concealed or failed to remember.
The opinion then established a procedure for transmitting the grand jury minutes of any deponent to the deposition judge after the deposition if a motion for inspection were made, or before the deposition if the judge, on his own motion, so requested. 03 He was to "contrast the Grand Jury testimony with the deposition and determine, in his own discretion, whether in the interest of justice there is compelling need for disclosure." 'D4 Concurrently, an order was entered implementing the procedure for transmission.' 0 5
The Initial Decision To Breach Secrecy
This transmission procedure raised a plethora of problems dealing with grand jury release. At the outset it was improper to have considered this unprecedented procedure for release to other courts without benefit of argument of counsel, particularly when no requests for transmission had occurred. However, the transmission procedure seems to afford adequate protection for secrecy. The initial determination regarding a breach of grand jury secrecy should be made by the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury. The district court for the District of Columbia quashed a subpoena duces tecum, served on the Attorney General, to obtain the minutes of plaintiff's testimony before a grand jury of the District of Massachusetts.?" The case held that the words "the court" in rule 6(e) '07 allowed release only by the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury, because it is in the best position to determine the 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. The court can find concealment only when a deponent testifies to a fact that he had earlier said he did not recall.
1o&Id, at 491. The district in which the grand jury sat has certain local interests, such as protecting the grand jury during its deliberations and preventing any tampering with witnesses, either before the grand jury or at trial, in addition to the desire to protect secrecy as a general policy. Moreover, a local district may take special precautions, not used in other districts, to encourage the candor of witnesses before its grand juries.
1 9 However, this initial determination need not include the finding of particularized need or other standard, but only a finding that, if an established test for the breach of secrecy can be met in the transferee district, no considerations particular to the local district will bar release. It is clear from Judge Clary's opinion that exactly this type of finding was made. The reasons for secrecy were examined, and a finding was entered that disclosure could be made if a compelling need were shown.
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n fact the opinion went even further and suggested possible categories of factual situations which would constitute such need in the opinion of the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury."' While this suggestion of what would constitute a sufficient showing to allow release is probably not required, it seems to be the preferable procedure since it provides a guide for the releasing judge.
The Requirement of an In Camera Examination
Another aspect of Judge Clary's opinion seems to require that the deposition judge make an in camera inspection of the minutes before ordering release." 2 While this is a question of first impression insofar as it purports to limit another judge to a prescribed procedure, this limitation seems appropriate because it cautions the deposition judge against permitting release to a party without first examining the minutes and making a finding of particularized need. Although an in camera inspection amounts to a technical breach of secrecy in that a judge who has not seen the minutes before is allowed to read them, it seems insignificant considering the federal trial judge's wide range of discretion to inspect material which is claimed to be privileged.
However, Judge Clary's requirement varies greatly from the rule in the majority of the circuits that the movant must demonstrate some sort 10821 F.R.D. at 235. In Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940), decided before the promulgation of rule 6(e), the court held that the responsibility for release lay with the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury. 115 and is an open question in some of the circuits. This required in camera inspection makes release of otherwise unobtainable facts possible, since there were no alternative routes through which the plaintiffs could discover inconsistencies in a deponent's prior testimony, while protecting grand jury secrecy by barring a breach until the inspecting court itself has ascertained the discrepancies calling for release."
6 In this sense Judge Clary attempted to strike a balance between the demands of the plaintiffs and the need to protect the grand juries of his own district.
But, the requirement of a mandatory in camera examination has its drawbacks. Ordinarily, the burden of showing the need for release rests with the party seeking it. Under the in camera procedure, the movant merely indicates what type of statements he is seeking, and the actual discovery of discrepancies or material useful for the purpose of refreshing the witness' recollection is made by the inspecting judge. Hence, it is the inspecting judge, 1 and not the movant's counsel, who must determine whether or not possibly ambiguous statements in the grand jury minutes are sufficiently important to require release." 8 This procedure also places the onus of reading what may be a burdensome set of minutes on the deposition judge.
119 Moreover, the difficulties of enforcing this inspection requirement may destroy its value. A second court may request a transmission of the minutes and yet refuse to inspect them before release even though the transmitting court has tried to require such inspection. this dilemma, the court of origin has few weapons with which to enforce its inspection requirement other than the refusal to transmit further portions of the minutes or perhaps an action in the nature of mandamus against the deposition judge. However, the deposition judges should realize that in order to encourage a general disposition toward complete disclosure before grand juries, the protection of secrecy through an in camera inspection is preferable to a direct release of the minutes.
D. The Initial Releases to the Plaintiffs
As a result of Judge Clary's opinion and order, the plaintiffs made a series of motions during the depositions to obtain the grand jury minutes of various deponents. Four of these motions were decided in favor of release by the Hon. George H. Boldt of the Western District of Washington 120 on the same day, 12 1 and established the pattern for all future releases based on Judge Clary's order.'2
In two of these situations, he sat as a special master,las and in the other two as a district judge sitting by designation. 124 In three of them the entire transcripts of the respective deponents' grand jury testimony were released on the bases that: (1)
120 Judge Boldt has played a unique role in these cases, both as a member of the Murrah Committee and as the judge before whom the bulk of the first round depositions were taken, even though these depositions were taken in New York, Chicago, and Miami. 124 These were the depositions of Brenan R. Sellers, a Carrier Corporation employee, and Donald J. Nairn, an Allis-Chalmers employee, taken in Chicago, although the order releasing Nairn's testimony was entered in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, apparently to allow an appeal from that district. segregation was "highly impracticable"; (2) that "there is no indication that any portion . . . need be withheld as being 'merely for discovery' purposes"; and (3) because a "particular compelling need" had been shown, the "end of justice" required release. 125 In the fourth case the same recitals were made and the same reasons were advanced, but only portions of the grand jury minutes were released. 1 6 In each instance the order recited the finding that an in camera examination revealed "many facts of vital importance to essential issues . . . which were not recalled or were denied by deponent in his deposition testimony." ' 7 Since the minutes were sought for use in discovery, the holding that they were not sought solely for discovery purposes seems questionable. However, Judge Boldt considered these depositions as "trial depositions" because they were being taken pursuant to rule 26(d)."-8 The need for release was as great at the deposition as it would be at trial because the depositions might constitute the major evidence at the trial of many of these cases3 2 m
The same supporting memorandum was filed with respect to each of these orders. In essence the memorandum merely recited the tests set forth in the leading Supreme Court cases, with particular emphasis on Procter & Gamble which Judge Boldt said did not foreclose all release but only release as a substitute for discovery.' 3 0 He also held that release was proper in a civil treble damage action, stating that there was no doubt that such an action was a proceeding seeking the compliance of a person "with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest" within the meaning of Doe v. Rosenberry.' 3 1
In the two cases in which Judge Boldt presided over the deposition as a judge, it was proper for him to order release since Judge Clary could delegate the finding of particularized need to a judge of coordinate jurisdiction.1 32 This process was essential to the success of the national deposition program because it avoided the delay and waste of effort concomitant to a hearing in Philadelphia before a judge who was unfamiliar with the prior deposition testimony. However, several complications arise in the two cases in which Judge Boldt presided over the depositions as a special master of the district in which the depositions were taken. Even though he is a judge, he was not, at that time, a judge of that district by virtue of an intercircuit assignment pursuant to the Judicial Code, 33 and his powers were only those of a master.
Master's Authority To Release Grand Jury Minutes
Traditionally, the courts have had inherent power to use a master, absent contrary legislation.
13 4 However, this power has been limited by the holdings, now codified in rule 53(b),13 that references could be made only in the exceptional case or where the issues were complicated.
1 3 6 In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 1 3 7 the Supreme Court held improper the reference of an entire antitrust case to a master to take evidence, make findings of fact, and submit conclusions of law because it had the effect of denying the parties a trial before the court on the merits. 3 8 However, one court has held that La Buy applies only to trial references and does not foreclose the use of a master in pretrial discovery,' 39 and several authorities have recommended this procedure, particularly in protracted cases.
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The advantage of a discovery master is that he can reduce the burdens on the court by ruling on questions of relevance and privilege without any significant abdication of the judicial function, particularly if the reference to the master provides for immediate review of any order by a district judge if the parties seek it.' 4 ' Discovery masters have been employed when the size and complexity of the case indicated a massive discovery process 142 or when discovery in distant places was necessary. 143 However, a motion to appoint a federal judge to supervise discovery has been denied on the ground that the court was so burdened with protracted litigation that the 133 See 28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1958) . A judge sitting by assignment has all the powers of a judge of the court to which he is assigned. 28 U.S.C. § 296 (1958 Despite these broad powers in discovery, it would seem that the determination of "particularized need" or "compelling necessity" for release of grand jury minutes is not properly allocated to a master. The determination demands a precise balancing of the factors allowing release against the policy of protecting the grand jury as an instrument of the criminal process. Because of its importance, the decision should be made by the local court itself, or at least by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction, who would be accustomed to weighing the same policy arguments in his own district. Moreover, mere approval of a master's release order by a district judge is not a sufficient protection for grand jury secrecy because the master's examination of the minutes is a breach of secrecy and because the master might release the minutes to the movant before the judge has reviewed the order.
In two cases Judge Boldt's release orders were entered under his authority as a master, I51 and would constitute reversible error under the preceding analysis. However, since he is a federal judge familiar with the balancing problem involved, his action under his authority as a master is probably an insignificant error. But the difficult problem of the authority of the nonjudicial master in discovery still persists. In these instances the 14 5 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). Basically, this rule provides that the powers of the master can be limited by the order of reference, and that in the absence of such limitation, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. question of who releases the minutes is not a mere technicality, as it was when Judge Boldt sat as a master, but a matter concerning the allocation of powers between the master as an aid to the judge and the judge himself.
152
2. An Example of Plaintiffs' Difficulties in Obtaining Release A subsequent order entered by Judge Boldt presents the complexities of obtaining grand jury release in this litigation. Prior to his national deposition, the deponent '53 had testified three times before the grand juries '4 and had been twice deposed locally.
155 A motion for release, made prior to the national deposition, was based on his local deposition testimony that he did not remember any price fixing at the Traymore Hotel meeting of competitors,' 56 although other local deponents had given contradictory testimony. 157 An argument on this motion before Judge Kirkpatrick resulted in the production of deponent's grand jury summaries and in the granting of an in camera examination of the minutes.
158
Subsequently, the parties stipulated that Judge Boldt would examine the minutes and decide the motion on the basis of the prior argument. 59 The motion was denied by Judge Boldt because there had been no showing of "any need, let alone a particular compelling need." 160 Following the close of this deposition, plaintiffs were granted a further examination of the deponent on the basis of his grand jury summaries.
16 '
During the second examination, deponent reasserted his denials of price fixing despite statements to the contrary in his grand jury summaries; 162 on the basis of these inconsistencies plaintiffs moved for the production of the deponent's grand jury minutes. 1 63 After a second in camera examination,' Judge Boldt released certain portions of two of the transcripts of the minutes on the grounds that the conflict between the two sets of testimony showed a "particular need . . . and that the ends of justice require [production) . . Burke was read portions of a memorandum of his activities prepared by General Electric's counsel on April 7, 1960, which stated that the "purpose of the meeting was to bring about stabilization of prices at a fair level," and that the market for the sealed-bid business in power circuit breakers had been divided. Burke contradicted this and stated that the meeting had not been to stabilize prices, and that a division of bids had been tried but was ineffective. Burke made similar responses to contradictory statements in NX 1082, p. 16, in 68 NDT, which he stated was a "falsified paper" in which he had made up some questions and answers and had not tried to tell defense counsel the truth. See OT N20736-37, N20750, 68 NDT 51, 59. 16728 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1958) , which provides in part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order .... Section 1292(b) seems to be of little help to the party seeking review of a pretrial order because of the narrow limitations of the statute. Such an order rarely presents an issue whose resolution will materially terminate the litigation. Moreover, because of the discretionary nature of discovery orders, they rarely constitute controlling questions of law. 170 While certain orders denying discovery may force plaintiff to abandon his suit and obtain review of the discovery order on appeal from a nonsuit, as he could before section 1292 (b) was enacted,' an equally unlikely vehicle for review of discovery orders. The preliminary nature of such orders does not comport with the basic concept of section 1291 that appeals are allowed only from final decisions 174 to avoid a piecemeal process of litigation. 175 Thus, courts have held that the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is not appealable since the subpoenaed party can refuse to appear or to produce the documents and then appeal from the sanction imposed for such failure.
176 One court has held that "rulings on the propriety or impropriety of deposition taking . . . are not 'final decisions' within [section 1291] .... ,, 177 However, the "refuse and take sanction" theory is inapplicable when the party asserting a privilege in a discovery proceeding is not the party from whom the information is sought. In this situation an appeal has been allowed from an order denying the claim of privilege because the privilege is meaningless after production, and the party claiming the privilege cannot withhold the documents to gain an appeal. 178 In addition to this small exception the courts have allowed immediate appeals from that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
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This "collateral order doctrine" has also been utilized to permit appeal when an exercise of discretion is not involved or when the rights claimed will be irreparably lost by delay.
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These two exceptions to the final order doctrine provide a rationale for allowing an immediate appeal from an order releasing grand jury minutes. It is obvious that grand jury secrecy is meaningless once the minutes are released even if this release should subsequently be found to be error, and that secrecy can be protected only by allowing an appeal before such release occurs. Since the minutes are not in the possession of the objecting party, he cannot refuse to produce them and obtain an immediate appeal from the sanction imposed by the court. Moreover, the party objecting to the release is asserting that release will be prejudicial to the grand jury as an institution, a claim which is separable from any other issues in the case and "too important to be denied review." Thus, while an order denying production would be denied immediate review since it affects only the movant's ability to prepare for trial, an order allowing inspection should be immediately appealable as a collateral order to protect grand jury secrecy.
However, the appeal from Judge Clary's order pursuant to section 1291 was dismissed without opinion on the grounds that the order was interlocutory and that the defendants lacked standing to appeal,,, Judge Clary's order was interlocutory insofar as it denied the release of the deponent's grand jury minutes, but it was collateral insofar as it established a procedure for future releases because it was clearly separable from the merits of the case and raised the issue whether Judge Clary could properly delegate the finding of particularized need to a judge in another district. However, this order was not final because the defendants could show no loss of right until Judge Clary entered an order transmitting the minutes to another judge. If the Third Circuit meant that the defendants did not have standing to appeal because they could show no present harm from Judge Clary's order, then the decision is correct. However, if the court meant that the defendants would not be proper parties to object to a release order or to a future transmission order, then the question of standing was incorrectly decided. In order to provide the court with an, adversary argument on the merits governing production and to afford the maximum possible protection to grand jury secrecy, either the grand jury witness' 82 or any party '1 has usually been given standing to contest an order directing production, or to appeal from an order denying production, 8 4 and even persons who were not parties have been allowed to object.' 8 5
While this rationale would not support an appeal from Judge Clary's order, it would suggest appellate review of the propriety of the transmission procedure. Review could be secured by appealing from the first order actually transmitting the minutes to another judge because this order would involve the claim that only a judge of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could release the minutes, because the order would be separable from the merits of the case, and because immediate review would avoid a later invalidation of the transmission process which might emasculate the national program. Since the defendants neither appealed the subsequent transmission orders nor sought a section 1292(b) certificate,' 8 6 they foreclosed any challenge to the order transmitting the earlier sets of minutes. While the passage of time and the use of the transmission procedure might not preclude an appeal from subsequent transmission orders, it seems unlikely that the Third Circuit would "upset the apple cart" by sustaining a challenge to the transmission procedure at this late date because such a decision would cast doubt on a number of depositions which had already been taken involving the use of grand jury minutes transmitted to another district. In short the transmission procedure established by Judge Clary has become the law of the electrical cases and perhaps of the future.
B. Appellate Review of Judge Boldt's Orders
Release While Acting as a Judge
In one of two instances where Judge Boldt presided over the depositions while sitting as a district judge by assignment, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's three attempts to appeal without opinion.
8 7 The Third Circuit denied leave to appeal under section 1292(b) from the other instance of release because the orders did not involve a controlling question of law and an immediate appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.' 88 In addition the court dismissed the section 1291 appeal on the grounds that the order was interlocutory and that the defendants lacked standing to appeal.
18 9 This decision seems incorrect in light of the suggested rationale for allowing an appeal from Judge Clary's transmission orders because the defendants did have standing to challenge the release order, and it would seem to be final within the meaning of the collateral order doctrine. Moreover, the need for appeal seems even greater in these cases than in the transmission cases because of the far greater scope of the breach of secrecy.
The defendants also petitioned the Third Circuit for writs of prohibition and mandamus 190 either to restrain Judge Boldt from releasing the minutes and Judge Clary from "approving and confirming" that order, or to force Judge Clary to vacate his order transmitting the minutes to Judge 
1964]
Release While Acting as a Master
In response to the first appeal from a release order entered by Judge Boldt sitting as a special master, the Second Circuit denied leave to appeal under section 1292(b) and a petition for a writ of mandamus, as well as dismissing the appeal under section 1291. 201 The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the release order despite its dependence on Judge Clary's order, but seemed to treat the transmission procedure as the settled law of the case. 22 The court held that Judge Boldt was in the most favorable position to determine the need for release, and that immediate interlocutory review was proper only if he had manifestly abused his discretion, which the court held he had not done. 20 3 Although the court indicated that it was aware that Judge Boldt acted as a master, it did not discuss whether this fact was relevant to its decision. However, the case should not be treated as implying that the finding of particularized need can be delegated to a master because the court referred to the finding as one "involving the discretion of the judge in conducting pretrial discovery proceedings".204 and probably did not consider either the problem of Judge Boldt's authority as a master or the problem of the nonjudicial master. Subsequently, an application for a stay pending certiorari was denied by Mr. Justice
Harlan.
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The second reaction to a release order entered by Judge Boldt while sitting as a special master resulted in the granting of leave to appeal under section 1292(b).206 On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that the question whether appeal was proper in that circuit was foreclosed by the granting of leave to appeal. 20 7 Treating the issue as being whether the proper standards for release had been met, the court held, inter alia, that release was proper to refresh a witness' recollection or to show inconsistencies in a witness' story. 08 The court stated that release was properly left to the discretion of the district court, and that there was no showing that such discretion had been abused. 20 9 The court did not discuss the scope of deponent after he had inspected the minutes and released them on a finding of particularized need. 2 21 Release should not be allowed when the minutes do not reveal sufficient material to warrant a reexamination since grand jury secrecy would be breached solely to aid the movant's trial preparation.
2 22 Although the deposition judge cannot be certain that the party requesting the minutes will seek a reexamination if he releases the minutes, he must be willing to hold that the minutes are sufficiently informative to warrant a further examination if requested.
B. Permissible Uses for Released Minutes
Both the characterization of the minutes as past recollection recorded and the rulings admitting them to the record are questionable. Some of the events described to the grand jury had occurred more than three years before the witness testified.2
This lack of contemporaneity would not be a bar to using the minutes to refresh the witness' recollection if the conspiracy continues until the time of the grand jury testimony and if the minutes are "reasonably calculated to revive the witness' present recollection." 22 If the witness' memory is refreshed, he testifies as to what he presently remembers, and the reliability of the document is not in issue. 225 However, if his recollection is not refreshed, then the minutes themselves would constitute the only evidence of the facts therein revealed. To insure the reliability of documents used as past recollection recorded, the courts have required that the facts be transcribed shortly after the event, 22 6 and the witness must state that the record accurately represents his knowledge and recollection at the time of recordation. 2 27 Thus, the three year delay should preclude the use of the minutes for this purpose. The fact that the narrative of the events was taken in a judicial proceeding should not The electrical cases suggest an effective method for ordering this discovery process by providing for a unified control of discovery through NPTO 1 26 and for a national deposition and discovery program modeled after NPTO 9237 and NPTO 16,21 the use of a judge to preside over the depositions, and use of the assignment machinery to supply the needed judicial manpower.
Once a national program is established, the depositions should provide for an initial examination followed by a recess during which a party desiring the grand jury minutes can move for their production. If no motion is made within a given time, the deposition can be adjourned. Further examination would then be barred except on a showing of good cause.
If such a motion is made, the deposition judge can then request the minutes from the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury, and the parties can argue the initial transfer motion before this latter court which would make the initial determination as to whether it will delegate the finding of particularized need to the deposition judge. Once this has been done, the court can enter a transmission order similar to Judge Clary's order in the electrical cases and no further motions before the controlling district would be necessary. After the minutes are transmitted to the deposition judge, an in camera examination may be granted at his discretion; however, if the movant can show discrepancies between the deposition transcript and other sources of information, such as other depositions, answers to interrogatories, and criminal indictments, an in camera examination should be granted. The deposition judge should then compare the deposition transcript with the minutes and order release if the deponent has failed to recall or has concealed facts vital to the plaintiff's case which would require a reexamination if requested. However, only those portions of the minutes relevant to the areas of inconsistency should be released.
An adequate appellate procedure is imperative when release is granted. Perhaps the best remedy for the inadequacies of the present methods of appeal is to retain the certification procedure of section 1292(b), but to amend that section to allow appeals from orders "where necessary for the prompt or efficient administration of justice." ' 2 9 A release order could then be certified for immediate appeal to review the impact of release on the institutional reasons for protection of grand jury secrecy. This procedure also provides an effective barrier against needless appeals since the district court's certificate is a limiting factor and since appellate courts have been loath to require such a certificate by mandamus when it has been denied below. 240 It is also limited by the discretion of the court of appeals to refuse to grant leave to appeal.
In summary the electrical cases are massive ones involving immense problems of coordinating discovery and of dealing with motions for the release of grand jury minutes as a part of this discovery. While the size is staggering, these cases do not represent a unique situation. It is quite likely that multiple litigation will also arise in other areas, including suits against a common carrier as a result of an accident, such as an airplane crash, 2 41 or against a cigarette manufacturer for breach of warranty. The electrical cases can serve as a guide for future multiple litigation. 
